An Economist analysis says the Kremlin will beef up psychological pressure to divide the alliance.

There is no hard evidence that Vladimir Putin plans to attack NATO. Yet, as The Economist warns, that doesn’t mean he won’t. Intentions are fluid in Moscow — and ambition, when coupled with grievance and opportunity, has a way of changing the map.

Two years into the war in Ukraine, Russia’s militarization has accelerated, its rhetoric has hardened, and its narrative has shifted from regional conquest to existential struggle. “There is no specific intelligence that suggests Russia intends to attack NATO,” the magazine writes. “But intentions are fluid.”

Behind that cautious phrasing lies an alarming pattern. Putin’s Russia is rebuilding its armed forces even as they bleed in Ukraine. Military factories are running round-the-clock, new units are being announced along the western border, and the Kremlin is testing Europe’s resilience through cyberattacks, sabotage, and disinformation.

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The buildup may not yet be enough for a full-scale war with NATO — but it could be sufficient for something smaller, faster, and far more dangerous.

“In the medium term,” The Economist notes, “Russia is unlikely to be able to build up the capabilities needed for a large-scale conventional war against NATO. However, Russia may develop military capabilities sufficient to launch a limited military action against one or several NATO countries.”

That phrase — limited action — haunts policymakers from Stockholm to Washington. A border raid in the Baltics, a missile that “accidentally” crosses into Poland, a Russian naval provocation in the Baltic Sea — all could test NATO’s unity and nerve.

Would the alliance risk escalation, even nuclear war, to respond? Or would it hesitate, fracturing in the face of Putin’s gamble?

Bullying is Putin's beloved weapon

For the Russian president, such brinkmanship could serve a familiar purpose. Each of his wars — from Chechnya to Georgia to Ukraine — was born of domestic weakness. When economic stagnation or political discontent threatens, a new conflict rekindles nationalist fervor and justifies repression. War has become central to how Putin sustains his regime, The Economist observes.

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That makes deterrence as much psychological as military. The West, the magazine argues, must show that even a “limited” Russian incursion would meet overwhelming response. But it must also prepare for a long twilight struggle — one in which Russia, feeling cornered and humiliated, lashes out not from strength but from fear.

Putin, after all, thrives on the perception of risk. He advances not when he is powerful, but when he believes the West is divided. His challenge is not just military — it is moral and political.

The real test for NATO may not be on the battlefield, but in whether it can convince the Kremlin that unity still has meaning. Fearing escalation and tolerating Moscow’s hybrid warfare will, in fact, lead to escalation, the magazine concludes.